Saturday, May 16, 2020

Berkeley’s Instrumentalism


One of the roles of philosophy is to clarify the concepts that are used in other subjects, as well as its own subject. Thus, when there is a breakthrough in, say, physics, there is usually a period of controversy as the new ideas sink in and are assimilated. Thus there were arguments over the ‘meaning’ of Newtonian mechanics, and similar discussions about the meaning of quantum mechanics.

Often philosophy follows quite carefully the ideas of the sciences. Philosophers, as I mentioned, usually see themselves as clearing away the intellectual clutter preventing or confusing ‘progress’. Not all philosophers, or physicists for that matter, follow the current scientific trends, however. A few are critical of new ideas, not because they are new, but because they do not make a lot of sense as originally put forward.

A case in point is George Berkeley (1685 – 1753). He is best known for an immaterialist philosophy (also known as ‘naïve idealism’), which no-one, I imagine, really believes today. However, he is interesting:

Virtually none of us are Berkeleian idealists but we love teaching Berkeley because he is a brilliant, mad Irishman who contrives wonderful arguments in support of (prima facie!) crazy conclusions. (Baber, H., The Trinity: A Philosophical Investigation (London: SCM, 2019), p. 5).

Berkeley, however, was also a critic of the new (for his day) Newtonian mechanics. In 1721 he published De Motu which, essentially (and as far as I understand it) has a go at the ideas of force, gravity, attraction, impetus and so on. It is important to understand that Berkeley was not guilty of the crime against progress which are often (wrongly) laid at the door of religious believers in general, that is dismissing something new because it is new, or because it does not fit with a particular set of religious doctrines. Berkeley’s objection is to these obscure ideas which seem to inhere in objects which are otherwise passive.

Berkeley does not dismiss Newtonian dynamics as false, of useless. He does not argue for a ‘better’ theory, one which removes these occult activities in bodies. What he does is question whether they are anything except useful calculational devices. That is, he has no objection to working out the trajectory of one billiard ball struck by another by means of resolving the forces on it onto a frame of reference and deducing the direction in which the second ball will move. What he does object to is the idea that these forces are in any sense real. They are calculation devices, to aid us in working out what is going to happen.

In this view, then, Berkeley is an instrumentalist. He views things like forces and attraction in gravity as a means of obtaining results, not as real objects in the world. He does have a point: try pointing to a force in the physical world. It always comes attached to a physical object and, if we did not simply accept that it existed, would be a weird concept which floated unattached in the world.

For Berkeley, a law of nature is a generalised principle, and explanation arises when phenomena follow the generalisations. Newton’s laws are therefore laws of nature because we can deduce from them regular phenomena which physical bodies experience – billiard balls bouncing off each other, for example. But the descriptive content of the laws are not, to Berkeley, important. What matters is the application of those laws, not how the results are calculated. We do not have to believe in forces, attractions, gravity and so on to use the laws and make predictions:

As for attraction, it is clear that this was employed by Newton, not as a true and physical quality, but only as a mathematical hypothesis. (De Motu section 17).

According to Berkeley, then, science aims at a sort of understanding of nature, a useful understanding, similar to that we obtain by studying the grammar of a language. Scientific laws are the grammar of phenomena, and we can use them to construct instances and cases in the real world. According to Berkeley, we go astray when we start to assign causes to physical objects. Causes, at least efficient causes, for Berkeley, should be assigned to incorporeal agents; in his case the agent is the Agent, God.

We do not have to buy into the whole or Berkeley’s metaphysics in order to get the point I am trying to make here. Nor is the point, in fact, about belief in God. Berkeley did believe in God – he became a bishop in the Church in Ireland – but that is not the point here. The point is that we do not have to believe that forces and so on are real, in the world, objects. They are, in Berkeley’s view, simply useful ideas to have around to calculate things with.

Whether you think that forces (etc.) are real or occult, however, is not something you can decide scientifically. Berkeley accepts the results of Newtonian dynamics, and, in fact, has no problems with the dynamics at all. He expresses scepticism about the existence of the concepts used to obtain the results but does not object to using the concepts to obtain the results. The results are the same whichever way you look at them. Newtonian realism or Berkeleian instrumentalism becomes a matter of choice, here. The calculations are the same, the mathematical derivations are the same and the experiments undertaken to verify the laws are the same.

I doubt there are many physicists or philosophers, or indeed anyone else, who would really doubt the existence of ‘real’ forces, but claims to experience forces do tend to drop away when you look at them in any detail. I may well feel the force of a wind, but that is because I am being bombarded by small particles at high velocity (and also pressure waves) and feel that. There is no ‘force of the wind’ per se. I feel a cumulative effect of it.

The fact is (and you might consider it a sad one, possibly, if you do not have a metaphysical bent) that when you drill down far enough, most scientific laws are grounded on a metaphysical choice, not on a set of hard facts. Some people would claim that the laws of physics are just brute facts about the universe, and they may be right. But such a claim is a metaphysical one, and cannot be proved from within science. Ultimately, the choice is a human one.

For more information (and with thanks to): Downing, L., 'Berkeley's Philosophy of Science', in Winkler, K. P. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 230-265.

Saturday, May 9, 2020

The History of Philosophy


It is one of the quirks of the history of philosophy that philosophical reflection has tended to get dragged along behind the sciences. Somehow, philosophy (or rather, philosophers) has been so entranced by the development of a particular science that they have believed that their own thinking or perhaps, the thinking of humanity in general, should proceed along similar lines.

The phenomenon is not new of course. Descartes was a mathematician as well as a philosopher and thought that philosophy should proceed mathematically. Famously (or perhaps infamously) Spinoza thought that ethics could be done geometrically. He was not, of course, daft enough to suppose that you could draw ethical diagrams and work out angles, but axioms and inferences are to be found in his work. Locke understood what he was doing as clearing away the undergrowth for natural philosophy – Newtonian science in his case – to prevail. Hume thought that he could reduce morals to a science, and so on down the line. The reputation of science for being a paradigm of human thought and clarity has a long history.

Other subjects have followed suit, of course. We have historical sciences, economic sciences, social sciences and so on, all trying possibly to accrue some of the impacts that the sciences, usually understood as the physical sciences, have on the world. People have said to me of their social science projects when I have shown them how to obtain a full set of data “That is more scientific”. I am still trying to work out what that means, but then I am not a social scientist.

Theology, of course, is not immune to this movement. Recently there has been a spate of concepts flying around to use some of the approaches of science to a method in theology – a scientific theology. This stuff is interesting, but it is a little difficult to see exactly how it helps. Theology, thinking about God, is not science, where science is thinking about things in the world.

It is possible that there is a link between the doing of science and the doing of other subjects. The people who consider that science is a paradigm of human thought have something of a point but not, perhaps, in quite the way they might have expected. The link is, of course, the human mind and brain. I do not want to get into the debate as to the difference or identity of the human brain and the human mind, but just to say that whatever it is, the same thing does the thinking behind science, history, theology and everything else. If (and it might be a sizeable if) the physical sciences give a paradigm of how we think, then we might be able to think a bit more clearly about other subjects.

To be fair to the philosophers I have mentioned above, and to everyone else who has trodden his path, I doubt if anyone was naïve enough to believe that the problems of philosophy could be solved by applying particular scientific or mathematical methods. It was the regularity, the testing, the clarity of thought and derivation that they were all after. We cannot clear away the undergrowth of thought without clarifying our understandings, our concepts and our knowledge of how we came to be here, in our current intellectual climate. Physical science, it is thought, does away with the fuzziness.

Unfortunately, my experience of doing physics is that in a research context at least, fuzziness is the norm. True, we attempt to work our way through things, to chop up the bits we do not understand into bits that we do and then reassemble them, but if things were easy or clear, there would be a lot less research around. Isaac Asimov once said the most powerful words in science are not ‘Eureka!’ but ‘That’s funny’, and he has a point. Scientists at least should be confident to say ‘I don’t know’, but that is often not how science and its progress are viewed.

The acclaim which scientific advances have accrued over the centuries have affected the self-confidence of other subjects. True, by comparison with mathematics and physics, the social sciences are new kids on the block, but, on the whole, most subjects are either cowed by scientific method or claim to use it for themselves. Interestingly, as a physicist, I do not remember ever having a lecture on ‘The Scientific Method’. The nearest I recall was a principle investigator calling a slightly naïve research student a clot for changing two variables in an experiment at a time and thus not being able to say which had caused the difference in the result. In other subjects it seems, research methods are widely taught.

The upshot of this accumulation of glamour to the physical sciences is that other subjects either retreat into themselves, arguing more and more over finer and finer points of nuance, or they subjugate themselves entirely to (mis-)understandings of science and what it can achieve. This is true of some trends in theology, where misreadings of relativity and (more often) quantum mechanics can lead to some very strange views about spirituality and truth claims. Fortunately, the mainstream of the subject has largely recovered from such weirdness, but they still happen (and, even more oddly, get published).

The physical sciences, however, are not quite as arrogant or all-conquering as views of them (or views put forward by some scientists) would have us believe. They may well be paradigms of how humans can think, intentionally, about a particular subject or problem. By this I mean that a lot of the things we do in science relate to problem-solving, from the simple (‘Where is the leak in my vacuum system?') to the more complex (‘How do I integrate this equation?’) and beyond; the most famous in modern physics would be Einstein’s wondering what it would be like to sit on a photon. But, as I have tried to suggest, this is not the whole arena of human thinking. We do not spend our entire time problem solving, even as working scientists. There is a lot more to life than science.

Saturday, May 2, 2020

All you touch and all you see...


Are all your life will ever be
(Roger Waters, ‘Breathe’, from Pink Floyd, Dark Side of the Moon, 1973).

The problem with empiricism and with logical positivism (or logical empiricism as some would have it called) is exactly the one referred to by Pink Floyd. According to empiricism, all we touch, and all we see, hear and smell is all there is. It is not possible for there to be anything else, and everything we think about is derived from these things. We start as a blank canvas, as new-borns, and that canvas is filled in by our senses and then our memory.

In fairness, there is a lot to say for this point of view. Much of what we do know comes about from the senses, enhanced, one way or another, by tools. An experiment in physics is really a way of looking at the world enhanced by a set of tools, usually called apparatus. Whether the world acts as it does when we look at it at other times in, strictly, a bit moot. Experience tends to suggest that it does – the sofa in the living room will still be there when I return in the evening, as it was this morning.

There is a great deal that empiricism cannot cover, of course. I have mentioned such speech-acts as ‘I will pay you back the money tomorrow’. This may or may not be true. Your decision as to whether it is a truthful speech-act is based, in the now, on a variety of factors such as my reputation, reliability, general honesty over the time you have known me and so on. You do not really know whether the speech-act is true until I arrive tomorrow brandishing the money. You might believe I will come, and that belief might be well-grounded, but you do not know.

There is a clear link between knowing something and believing something, and whether it is true, but they are not the same. As I mentioned, a definition of knowledge is that it is justified true belief. There are holes in this definition, but it passes for everyday use. To borrow an analogy from Alvin Plantinga (and to make it relevant to a more international readership) I may believe that Northampton Town will win the FA Cup next season. You, of course, knowing the relative position of the Cobblers in the league, their lack of money and so on, will not think that this counts as knowledge; it is simply an ungrounded wild hope.

Suppose, however, that by some freak of the draw, of the results and so on, Town does win the FA Cup. Does my initial claim at the beginning of the season now count as knowledge? Of course not; my initial claim just happens to have been true, it was not foreknowledge. The belief, as it turned out, was justified and true, in that the world worked that way. It could not have counted as knowledge. After the fact, the statement ‘Northampton Town won the FA Cup’ is knowledge, it is a true belief, justified, if nothing else, by the club’s name on the trophy.

Something clearly was missing from my initial claim even though it was a justified true belief. Plantinga calls the missing bit ‘warrant’. Warrant, in this argument, is the missing bit between a justified true belief and its being knowledge. I have no warrant for my claim that the Cobblers will win the FA Cup. After the event, of course, I do. Something changed, in this case, the events of Northampton winning all their cup matches.

Plantinga’s argument is, of course, a great deal more complex and subtle than this example. But his point remains: we believe things as being true even if we cannot claim them as knowledge in any conventional sense. Plantinga’s main aim is the Christian faith. He argues that we can know that God exists without having to prove it. There is no reason for someone to have to provide arguments for the existence of God if they believe that God exists. In the jargon, belief in God is properly basic in the sense that we believe that two plus two equals four, and in the sense that we don’t believe that 1764 is the square of 42 (because most of us would have to sit down and work it out, rather than immediately believe it to be true).

Similar sorts of issues pervade life, of course. Physicists believe that electrons exist even though we cannot see them. They just make a lot of sense out of disparate data. I have no a priori argument for the existence of electrons; I cannot produce an argument that they exist. I can produce a whole load of data which suggests that they do exist, that physics since the beginning of the Twentieth Century has not been suffering a massive delusion, but so far as I know there is no argument starting from nowhere which proves that electrons are necessary. In that sense, they might well be properly basic beliefs in physics.

Is a properly basic belief in electrons the same as a properly basic belief in God? Here, of course, it depends on what you might count as evidence. There is a lot of experimental evidence for electrons existing, even though, in fact, alternative explanations for it exists in the annals of the philosophy of science (for example, the electron is just an organising ‘jingle’ for humans, not a real object in the world). Similarly, people can adduce evidence for the existence of God. As Plantinga notes, whether you can it as evidence for the existence of God tends to depend on your ‘pre-philosophical commitments’, that is, whether you already believe in God or not.

Is the existence of the electron true? We believe, at least as Twenty-First Century physicists that it is. Will Northampton Town win the FA Cup next season? Unlikely but not impossible. Does God exist?

For Plantinga see, among others:
Plantinga, A. (1981) 'Is Belief in God Properly Basic?', Noûs, vol. 15, no. 1, pp 41-51.
Plantinga, A. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, New York; Oxford, Oxford University Press.



Saturday, April 25, 2020

Logical Positivism


According to some, modern science has conquered the world. Some scientists, and some others, have been so impressed by the achievements of science that they believe that everything is a scientific problem and that all scientific problems can be solved. It is just a matter of time, effort and the application of the scientific method.

Other problems that people have, such as decisions over life and death, whether to fall in love (insofar as that might be a decision), how to bring up children, whether to read this novel or watch that television program can all, under this model, be solved by scientific means. A quick brain scan to establish which areas light up with activity when you think about your proto-beloved and you can get the go-ahead for a relationship. The reason we do not do this is that the technology is not quite there yet, and it might take a while to obtain relevant results.

That does not stop some people, of course, from arguing that more or less everything is subject to scientific control and experiment. Nothing else exists – our thoughts about our beloved are ‘nothing but’ brain activity. How we get for a bunch of jumping neurons to a conscious thought about our beloved (or whatever else, of course) is never really explained. Science is reductionist, on the whole, so we can drill down from thoughts to neurons hopping, but not the other way terribly successfully.

The ultimate in this sort of thinking was perhaps the philosophical movement known as Logical Positivism. For various reasons the proponents of this set of ideas (it was not really a single, coherent, movement) was that everything had to verifiable or it could be ruled out as legitimate discourse. The English version of this was promulgated by A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic, first published in the 1930s. The work introduced the idea of the verification principle, that a proposition is said to be verifiable in the strong sense if and only if its truth could be conclusively established in experience. In the weak sense, a proposition is verifiable if experience could render it probable. This was tremendously influential in Anglo-American philosophy.

The problem is that the verification principle rules out a lot of our normal experience and understandings. ‘Murder is wrong’ is not probable nor can it be verified by experiment – you cannot go an murder a sample of people and establish that it was wrong to do so in each and every case. The world simply does not work the way this philosophy would like it to. Logical Positivists had to resort to ideas such as emotionalism, arguing that a statement such as ‘Murder is wrong’ cannot be verified (a relief to those of us who would rather not see philosophers on the street murdering people) but is an emotional response instead. Our moral world is reduced to our emotional reactions: ‘Murder is wrong’ is at the same level as ‘I love Bach’. Surely something has gone wrong here.

There are other problems as well, of course. Intentionally, Logical Positivists had a tendency to rule that religious statements were non-sense assertions and then, by linguistic sleight of hand aver that religion was nonsense. Now, of course, some religious statements are nonsense, but no more than statements made in other walks of life such as politics or science. The removal of metaphysics, religion and morality from the realm of sense suggests that the whole agenda is a bit flawed.

The verification principle, in its bald form, is ‘no statement is true unless it is a tautology, evident from the senses or self-evident’. Thus, ‘here is a tree’ is verifiably true, as is ‘all unmarried men are bachelors’. As we have seen, ‘murder is wrong’ is not verifiable, but then nor is ‘I love you’ ‘I will meet you tomorrow at five o’clock’ or ‘God sustains the world’. None of these latter statements would usually be regarded as nonsense, however – they are intelligible, even if we cannot agree with them.

The problem is with the verification principle itself. In fact, the principle is self-stultifying. Itself it is neither a tautology, self-evident not evident from the senses. According to its own lights, then, the verification principle is nonsense, or at least, non-sense. I doubt that there are many philosophers in the world who would subscribe to it anymore, and few in the last fifty years or so who would take is terribly serious, except as an example of how philosophy can go badly wrong.

The influence of logical positivism is, however, still widespread in the education system and among some rather, perhaps, philosophically naïve scientists. To be fair, it takes a while for such problems to work their way out of a system. If the current crop of teachers were trained by people who had been trained by those who subscribed to logical positivism, perhaps we should not be surprised that it has a rather long half-life. Similarly, most scientists are philosophically naïve. While there might be late-night undergraduate discussions about the meaning of quantum mechanics, science is simply not taught with an idea of the philosophical background to it.

We therefore land up with eminent scientists making pronouncements that would not be out of place on a logical positivist’s platform. Among these might be ideas that the existence of God or the usefulness of prayer should be subject to experiment. One of two of these ideas have been tried out, of course, such as having people in hospital prayed for and seeing if they recover more quickly than others, or praying that God would strike the subject with lightening to prove He exists.  This is all rather naïve (not to say silly) but can be taken rather seriously by those who subscribe to a logical positivist or total empiricist position.

The real failure in such thought systems is not of science, or of theology or philosophy, but of individuals failing to note that all positions actually return to metaphysics, some set of underlying beliefs that cannot be justified, verified or claimed as being universally true in all times and places. We stand on thousands of years of the evolution of human thought, and we do not arrive at the ‘big questions’ without some background knowledge and understanding. If we start to assume that the place where we stand the only coherent one, then we have not just lost any argument with those who differ from us, we have rather lost our ability to be in the discussion at all.

Saturday, April 18, 2020

Empiricism


A particular view of the world and of science, in particular, is empiricism. In some senses it is a British phenomenon – Locke, Berkley and Hume are generally regarded as the ‘British empiricists’, and their influence does pervade the British, and plausibly, the English speaking world. That is not to say that the three agreed. Berkley rose to be a bishop, Hume was possibly an atheist, and Locke is often regarded at the forefather of Deism. Even within that, Hume regarded Berkley as a sceptic and Locke died having a Psalm read out to him. Even Hume was either too cautious or too sceptical of his own ability to discourse on a deity to be particularly clear as to his religious convictions.

Paul Avis observes (Avis, P. (2014) In Search of Authority: Anglican Theological Method from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, London, T & T Clark.) that recent historiography has attempted to understand figures who are recognised as precursors to the modern, scientific, worldview as atheists or, at least, sceptics to such a degree as their own religious beliefs are underplayed. For example, there is no evidence that Sir Francis Bacon was an atheist – he was brought up as a Puritan and never seems to have strayed far from the Church of England as founded. A thorough search of his writings can turn up ideas that might be seen as opposing Christian doctrine, but that is also true of most theologians. Expressing an idea which is opposed to orthodoxy is not, in itself, an admission of unorthodoxy, heresy or anything else. It might be being intellectually honest.

Within the world of empiricism, it is a bit hard to make the ‘leap’ to God. The empirical is based on those things which we can perceive. Hume is very clear – everything we can conceive is either based on perception (I can hear the birds singing) or memory (I hear this cheeping noise and I know that birds make that noise, so I know the birds are singing). Everything else is a product of putting these things together – perceptions and our memories of them.

There are problems here, naturally. Essentially, the danger of strict empiricism is that we start without knowledge of the world and do not seem to be able to obtain any. So we have to start from knowing something (that the world exists) which means that not everything can be a perception. Foundationalism, the idea that knowledge must start with something we can know incorrigibly, cannot be strictly correct. The mind cannot be a blank sheet on which the world is inscribed, together with our ways of connecting those impressions.

Science is, in some of its forms, a type of empiricism. There is an idea in the philosophy of science called ‘constructive empiricism’, whereby a theory is empirically adequate if what it predicts is true. Hence, we can live happily with a theory which uses the concept of an electron, so long as it predicts things which are true (say, about electric currents flowing which we can measure). We do not have to believe in the existence of electrons at all.

The problem here is that physicists, in general, do believe in the real existence of electrons. Their theories might be empirically adequate and, as we have seen, ultimately unprovable, but most physicists actually believe that there are in the universe entities which we label electrons. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that electrons do exist as entities, and that evidence arises from different experiments and theoretical endeavours.

Electrons are, of course, very small (actually, they have no measurable radius, and are usually taken to be mathematical points). At such a small scale they behave oddly, counterintuitively. The scale of action of a single electron is so small that we cannot imagine it, imagine what is going on at that level or what an electron might see. All we can do is apply some ideas of quantum mechanics and mathematics and compare the results with what we see at the human scale. We cannot ‘understand’ an electron.

Our knowledge of what is true in the world is therefore not as great as we might like, or might be led to believe. That does not stop us, of course, from behaving as if many things are true, such as believing that it is raining at the moment, or that if I fall I shall hurt myself. We need to know a lot of things that are true in order to survive at all. Imagine how difficult life would get if we needed to convince ourselves every mealtime that it is true that we need to eat to survive. Some psychological cases along those lines exist, and they are often tragic, but fortunately, most of us will simply have something to eat because we are hungry.

There are a lot of things, therefore, tied up in what we know, what we believe to be true. Sense perceptions are some of them, a big factor, but they are not the only factor. One day I was driving to work in the dark and I say in front of me two rear lights from a van, one on the extreme left of the inside lane of the dual carriageway, one on the extreme right of the outside lane. I thought ‘that is a very wide van’. Immediately, however, the idea of a two-lane wide van was rejected by some other part of my mental apparatus and I looked again and noted the car which was blocking my sight of both the other rear lights. Perception is important but does not rule without question.

It is part of philosophical folklore history that Hume shocked Kant out of his ‘dogmatic slumbers’ into his idealism, although I cannot, for the moment, put my hands on the book that downplays Hume’s influence. Nevertheless the problem remains. Kant’s idealism does not really solve the problem, but places it within us. All we can perceive is the phenomenal and that perception is essentially the same problem as that tackled by Hume, the problem of getting from perception to our minds, and from perception to what is “out there”.

Saturday, April 11, 2020

Science and Truth


Truth, or at least knowledge, can be thought of as ideological. There is knowledge, that is, justified true beliefs that were obvious to our ancestors but are anything but to us. The position of women in society is one of them, although the historical record shows that that seems not to have been quite as robust as the (male) commentators of the time would have claimed.

There are also claims that science is ideological. After all, the ‘scientific revolution’ was a Western innovation and was dominated by males. A certain quantity of scepticism is therefore aimed at the claims of science, with suggestions that it is inherently sexist, racist and so on. I am not expert enough to comment on the sexism and racism that is (or was: let us hope that things are improving) extant in the history of science, but it does sometimes seem that those women who did achieve anything in the sciences are lauded simply by being rare.

Ideological claims about science go beyond the accusations of modern cultural suspicions. Science can start to claim hegemony overall knowledge, and at that point, it either starts to look a bit silly or becomes dangerous. An example of this is some misconceived ‘experiments’ designed to determine whether prayer (presumably to the Christian deity, but I forget the details) ‘works’. This entails a great deal of difficulty and a large number of assumptions about prayer, the deity in question and what on earth a prayer working would look like. Some things, it seems, cannot be subjected to the empirical study the natural sciences are based on.

In fact, consider a few other options. Try designing an experiment to see if your partner loves you. Can this be reduced to a set of variables which can be controlled against? I very much doubt if any such experiment could be conducted and, of course, if you did conduct such an experiment and got a positive result, you would then have to conduct another one to see if, after the experiment, they still loved you.

As another issue, consider the experiments required to determine the truth of ‘I shall meet you under the clock tomorrow at noon.’ In advance, there are few empirical activities you could undertake to establish the truth of this statement. You could, I suppose, evaluate the history of the speaker, rating them for accuracy, reliability and so on. You could enforce upon them a lie detector test. None of these would seem to be as accurate as simply believing them to be telling the truth and waiting for them to turn up tomorrow, under the clock at midday.

It is not, therefore, simply in religious behaviour that the claims of some scientists to be the sole source of knowledge start to look silly. Human relationships, on the whole, cannot be so evaluated. As can be imagined, even science itself is a product of a set of human relationships, and these are, in general, not measured. We are back to the question of ideology in science again. By assumption, and simply to get anything working at all, some stuff has to be excluded – in this case, the humanity of the observers.

The idea of modern science is that experiments can be repeated and, when that is done by a different set of people, they will get the same result. This is quite hard to achieve, due to constraints of time, money, personnel and equipment, but it can be done. Early in my career as a scientist I came up with an unexpected result and published it, without any explanation of how it came about (because I did not know) although it was supported by one set of calculations (although not by two others). Another research group did happen to have the time, equipment and interest to try it out. Doubtless, they also had a degree of scepticism about my results as well. They reported their results at a conference which I attended and confirmed them.

The example is of something which is assumed in modern science but often does not happen. As with the coherence theory of truth, if the new result coheres with the expectation often there is not much interest or confirmation. If the result defies the rest of the subject, then researchers around the world start checking up on it. Sometimes flaws are found; sometimes the new results or ideas are confirmed. That is how science develops.

Bayes’ theorem is in use here. The probability of a hypothesis given a set of evidence is regarded as the probability of the hypothesis without the evidence multiplied by the probability of the evidence being true given the hypothesis, divided by the probability of the evidence being true. The more evidence there is given the hypothesis, the bigger the probability of the hypothesis being true (it is easier to see this in the formula, and hard to type about; see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem/).

P(h|e)=P(h)P(e|h)/P(e)

This is of course precisely what happened in the case of my observation: someone repeated the experiment and obtained the same result. The probability of the result being true was therefore increased, and the probability of the calculation which gave the same answer as my result being true was raised as a result. The result is in the literature, although so far as I know it has not been fully explained as yet.

There are, naturally, problems with Bayes’ theorem, but I do not think we need to go into them. What I have described is the normal process of science, but I dare say you have spotted a problem. We are talking in a rather loose way, about the theorems and experiments being ‘true’. The point here is that the science can never make the probability of the hypothesis given the evidence one; the hypothesis can never be said to be absolutely true. There is no proof in science; only in mathematics can things be said to be proved and even then there are problems.

Normally, this lack of proof does not matter one jot. There is sufficient experience, other evidence and coherence with other results and theory around to enable us to make reasonable judgments about what is true and what is not, even if the truth is ‘overwhelmingly probable’ rather than ‘proven’. But often that is not how the rhetoric of science works – words like ‘proven’ and ‘shown’ are bandied around in the media and some scientists fall for their own claims about the power of science.

Saturday, April 4, 2020

Coherence and Correspondence


Pontius Pilate’s question ‘What is truth?’ addressed to Jesus, of course, invokes an irony to readers of the Gospel of St John. A few chapters earlier, Jesus had told his disciples ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the light’ (John 14:6). At his trial, Pilate inquires of Jesus, the prisoner, ‘What is truth?’ The seeker asks the Truth the nature of truth.

Without getting into the complexities of how the truth could be embodied in a person, we can describe the truth in two general theoretical ways. The first is the correspondence theory and the second is coherence theory. The correspondence theory suggests that truth is not mind-dependent in any significant way. If I see a field, a field is before me. True propositions (‘I see a field’) correspond with reality (there is a field which I am looking at). There are, of course, many nuances of this theory which philosophers and others have delighted in engaging with, but for the moment we can say that the correspondence theory is a form of realism: what you see is what is there.

The coherence theory suggests that what is true coheres with other propositions. A true proposition is in agreement with many other justified true propositions. Those propositions, of course, are coherent themselves with other justified true propositions, and so on. The problem here is that all the coherent propositions might be wrong; the mental structure could be entirely coherent within itself but bear no relationship to the world.

Which of the theories is right? Well, it depends on what you mean but I suspect that, practically, both have elements of correctness in them. We do perceive and all of us believe that most of our perceptions are correct. I can perceive my cat and stroke her. I see her, feel her fur, hear her purring and so on, and these perceptions go together to make the proposition ‘this is my cat’ which I accept as true. I do not, unless I am writing like this, actually think like that. I recognise my cat (and she recognises me) and we interact. There is some correspondence of perception with the world; there is some coherence of perception with other justified truths. We do not really seem to have advanced very far.

Ideas of truth rapidly run into other, equally contested, ideas. Justification is one of them, as is belief. One idea of knowledge is that it is a justified true belief. That is, if I believe something that is both justified and true then I know something. Unfortunately, this idea was debunked by Gettier (Gettier, E. L. (1963) 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis, vol. 23, no. 6, pp 121-123.) who showed that some, at least, justified true beliefs are not knowledge. Knowledge, then, is another contested concept.

These questions become rather more acute when we look at something that assumes knowledge, truth and justification. For example, an experiment in physics is built on a whole pile of other experiments, theoretical constructs and the relationship between the two. It is often said that theory is experiment laden and experiment is theory-laden, and that is true. The implications of that are far more significant than usually imagined, however.

Suppose I, as I used to, want to carry out an experiment in the spectroscopy of a plasma. This is just a jargon-ridden way of saying I want to look at the light emitted when I put a current through a low-pressure gas, helium in my case. The current causes the atoms to ionise, and the ions collapse into a thin pencil in the centre of the tube. As they have extra energy, the atoms and ions emit light at energies (frequencies) which are known from non-plasma experiments and from theoretical calculations. The shape and location of these spectral lines can be measured and this yields information about how the ions and atoms are affected by being in a plasma.

The experiment, then, rests on a large quantity of assumptions and beliefs. Atomic theory is one of them, which tells me where the spectral lines should be and also goes towards explaining the broadening and shift of them. But there are more theoretical and experimental items in the pile supporting this experiment – ideas about electrical currents and ionisation; about the detection systems; theories of how spectrometers work (the equipment used to spread the light out in wavelength so we can see the spectral lines); measurements of the calibration of the equipment; statistics about the repeatability of the results and so on.

The point here is not the details of the experiments I conducted (you have to be an enthusiast for that), but the mound of previous experiment, theory and testimony about those theories and experiments that there is. The testimony comes in the form of scientific articles that are peer-reviewed and published; in textbooks; in lectures, seminars, over coffee and by working with others in the same laboratory, learning how stuff is done. When the pile of stuff needed to understand a single experiment is considered, it starts to seem a bit remarkable that we can achieve anything like knowledge. No wonder that the claims of science often seem to be very cautious and modest. They have to be.

Truth, in a scientific context, is elusive. I cannot tell you what is true about an atom in a plasma. I can tell you something about how the light from that atom (and a large number of its colleagues) might be like, and what that may tell us about how the atoms are behaving in those conditions. I have a model, partly mathematical, partly in my head, of how these things work. But it is a model, it is not a description of how these things work. Often we forget that our scientific models are models, not descriptions of reality. Is a scientific (or any other sort of) model ‘right’?

The best a scientific model can do, really, is to predict some stuff (say the light emitted by a plasma) and we can see whether the prediction and what we measure match. Further, we can try to explain why they might not. I once received a note on an undergraduate laboratory experiment report praising me for my ability to ‘explain (away) the results’. As the foregoing suggests, I am still trying to work through the implications of that.

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