Saturday, July 4, 2020

Levels of Meaning

We suggested last time that there are different ‘levels’ of meaning. What I mean here is that we can describe a giraffe in different ways: the common sense way, whereby a giraffe is a four legged animal with a long neck and spots, and a more theoretical way, where it has adapted to a particular environment by finding an ecological niche whereby a long neck enables grazing on otherwise unreachable food.

I put the word ‘level’ in scare quotes because it is a metaphor, and we sometimes have difficulty with metaphors. In this case, ‘level’ does not mean necessarily that one is better than another. The problem with spatial metaphors is that a higher level can seem to indicate superiority. In this case it indicates difference, only, not necessarily the superiority of the theoretical over the common sense.

As an example, consider the cycle of day and night. From the common sense point of view the sun rises and sets, and moves around the sky. From the perspective of physical theory, of course, the Earth rotates. This does not actually cause us too many problems. We can quite happily talk about sunrise without finding any cognitive hiccoughs over the fact that we know, theoretically, that the Earth rotates. We can live in both the common sense and theoretical world quite happily.

What we do not, or should not, do is to attempt to live in both the common sense and theoretical worlds at the same time. This can lead to all sorts of difficulty and confusion, and often impedes the progress of theoretical (in the sense here of scientific) work. It is, after all, obvious that the Earth does not move. We cannot feel it moving, although there is some evidence, from the motion of the planets, that something more complex is going on than everything simply rotating about us. It took centuries to work out what, however.

That working out required a degree of separation of the theoretical and the common sense. The approach taken, in order not to upset the authorities, was to suggest the heliocentric solar system as a hypothesis, for the purposes of calculating things more easily. That was just about acceptable to a church, university and society which had accepted a form of the Aristotelian universe, so long as it was never said that the Earth went around the Sun. Of course, it did not take long before the common sense idea was replaced by the heliocentric solar system largely because the latter was a lot simpler mathematically.

The transfer from one level of meaning to another is, therefore, not straightforward, but thinking you are at one level when you are at the other is problematic. For example, Creationism, the idea that the world was created in seven days, following the first chapter of Genesis, is a common sense sort of idea. Accounts of the world such as that (or rather, those) in Genesis are common sense accounts. After all, no-one was witness to the events recounted (except God) and so we have to in fact look for a non-common sense, a theological, meaning to the stories. Exactly what these are is not the issue here. The issue is if we read the account in Genesis 1 as a theoretical account, we land up with a load of silly ideas about the start of the world, and a denial of a lot of accepted science. Concepts that are in that position are usually incorrect.

To transfer from one level to another can be difficult. As in the case of Creationism, as much has to be unlearnt as new has to be learnt. Modern science and theology of the natural world starts from a very different place than modern creationism, and reaches different conclusions. No amount of effort by ‘scientific’ creationists to bridge that gap will in fact achieve it. As a common sense world view it perhaps works, but as a useful one for technology and science it does not.

Primarily, then, moving from the level of common sense to the level of theory (or science) is a question of education. We learn about the evolution of giraffes and, once we have done so, we can appreciate the giraffe both as a four legged animal with a long neck, and as a highly evolved adaptation to a particular environment. Once we have understood the evolution of giraffes, however, we can move from the level of common sense – the four legged animal with a long neck – to one of ‘theory’ - the evolved creature - without much cognitive effort. The interesting question is, perhaps, how anyone managed it in the first place, or how we manage to make the transition when we learn about it.

Often the move is made, or suggested, by a model or a metaphor. In science the move from the Earth centred universe to the Sun centred solar system was made by diagrams and physical models of things going around a centre. From this the motion of the planets from the viewpoint of the Earth can be understood. Sometimes, the planets move backwards because the Earth overtakes them in orbit. This retrograde motion was a puzzle in the Earth centred universe, but was solved by the heliocentric one. But the move was from common sense to theory, and that move was enabled by a lot of observational data but made by a new model of the world.

Similarly (although I do not know this, not being a zoologist) the move from a common sense giraffe, as giraffe that just is as it presents, to the giraffe as a result of millions of years of evolution requires some sort of shift, achieved by the sorts of metaphors and models which we can learn as part of our biological studies. As with the cycle of day and night we can then live at both levels quite happily.

The question is then, of course, is there a further level beyond that of theory, as theory is beyond that of common sense. But that would be another post.


Saturday, June 27, 2020

Model and Metaphor

Language is the medium with which we communicate, and hence, of course, how we communicate truths. But language is not as straightforward as we might think. There are the issues already mentioned, of redundancy and communication in lossy (say, noisy) environments. There are also the issues Wittgenstein raised around the use of language in specific contexts, where a word can mean different things depending on what we are trying to communicate. But there are other issues as well.

The most obvious extra issue is about how language actually works. In principle, letters are just marks on a page and sounds are just compressions and rarefactions in the air. The meaning is given to these marks by the hearer or reader. When we learn a language, we learn how these marks on a page (I will simplify, but it works the same for learning a spoken language) relate to objects, ideas, concepts and so on, in other words, what was intended by the writer.

Language evolves, and the meanings of words evolve with it. Thus, for example, the word ‘tradition’ means ‘that which is handed down’. This retains pretty much its basic meaning, but extra elements, nuances and so on, accrue as well. Tradition can be used as a word which is positive, such as ‘traditional church service’ or one which is negative, say contrasting ‘tradition’ with ‘progressive’. In many cases, of course, the use of the word is subjective, depending on whether I like a traditional service or not.

Things are never even as simple as this. Much language is folded into metaphors. Even something fairly simple, such as ‘understand’ is a metaphor – the original meaning is ‘stand under’ in the sense of knowing and agreeing with something. Much of the time, of course, such a metaphor does not trouble our thinking: the metaphor is, so to speak ‘dead’, the metaphorical content in our ordinary language is practically nil.

Other metaphors are alive, well and living in our language. Some we may not recognise: ‘The case is closed’ for example, is a metaphor related, I imagine, to packing for a holiday. The packing comes to an end, the suitcase is sealed and nothing more is to be added. The case is closed, and we get on to the next thing. The allusions of the metaphorical expression are not explicitly brought to mind when we hear it, but they are there. In context we simply understand that someone is trying to draw a line under a controversy, trying to rule out further discussion and argument.

In illustrating the original metaphor and its meaning I have, of course, just used two more. I do not, in fact, literally draw a line under a controversy. In a document, I might put a line in to separate sub-regions, but in a conversation, we understand the meaning without considering the metaphor. To rule out is a similar sort of thing. We exclude something by framing the area of discussion – and there is another metaphor, explaining the previous one which explains the original metaphor. And so on.

Metaphors can act as traps for the unwary. Often they can be read literally and metaphorically. For example, ‘God is the Father’ can be read as God being someone who has male characteristics – a beard for example. But further investigation suggests that ‘God is the Father’ is not to be read in this way – ‘God has characteristics of fatherhood’, perhaps is a better way of putting it, or maybe better ‘God has the characteristics of the very best possible human fathers, and then some’. What we gain in accuracy we lose in compactness of expression.

Religious language is of course littered with metaphors. We are trying to express the inexpressible. If God is supernatural and spiritual, it is unlikely that our ordinary language, most of which is material and experience bound, is going to manage any sort of direct expression of God. The finite struggles to express the infinite; it can only be achieved by allusion, illustration, story and model, hoping that the reader or hearer will catch on, grasp the meaning which we cannot elucidate directly.

Modern science also is riddled with the language of metaphor and model, particularly the latter. As a metaphor is an illustration of something for another to catch on to, not a direct reference, so a model is an aspect of the world, perhaps simplified, for others to grasp. A model of an atom is not a representation of how an atom ‘works’, it is an object, a mental construct, which can help us grasp how an atom behaves.

As with metaphors, if we mistake the model for the real thing, we will ultimately be led into errors, or at least surprises. So, for example, the original ‘plum pudding’ model of the atom, whereby the electrons and protons were distributed evenly in a sphere, led to Rutherford famous experiment firing alpha particles at a thin sheet. Every once in a while, one of the alpha particles bounced backwards, while the majority passed through the sheet. According to the plum pudding model this should not have happened, the atomic spheres were uniform. Something was wrong with the model, evidently.

The languages of religion, and the languages of science, are, therefore riddled with models and metaphors. These are not ‘twiddly’ bits of language which we can discard when we try to speak exactly, they are intrinsic to the process of doing theology and doing science. When we say that an atom is like the solar system, or that God is our Rock, we mean neither expression literally. God is our rock in the sense that he is the ultimate foundation of being, for example, not because he is a lump of granite in someone’s back garden. Similarly, an atom is a bit like a solar system in that it has a massive centre, like the Sun, and bits orbiting around it. But if we push these models or metaphors too far we start to say silly things. Awareness of the limits of models and metaphors is as important as knowledge of their potential.


Saturday, June 20, 2020

Language and Meaning

Many years ago someone observed to me that until after the Second World War language had been presumed to be transparent. That is, that words meant what they said and said what they mean. As with most generalisations this was not quite the case, but as a broad brush it will do.

After the Second World War two things happened. The first was a degree of technological innovation, the start of digital communications. This led to the development of communications theory, an effort led by Claude Shannon. This rang a bell with me, because many years before the language lecture I am referring to, I did a course on communication physics, and struggled with an object called Shannon’s theory. If you read Shannon’s original papers (in Physics Review) they are quite easy to read, but the concepts are a bit mind bending.

Shannon observed that much everyday language is redundant. That is, much of what we say or write is unnecessary to communicate what we mean. If you work it out, I seem to recall that up to 80% of a sentence in English is redundant. Y__ c_n s__ wh_t I m__n _n t__s se____ce. It might well slow you down, working out the content of the missing letters, but the context and rules of grammar actually give you most of the missing letters.

We can, therefore, produce an ‘ideal’ language of, say zeros and ones, with no redundancy and be able to say exactly what we mean. The information content is maximised, the redundancy is zero. However, problems arise when you use a ‘lossy’ medium that is one with noise or dispersion in it. Then the difference between zeros and ones can be lost and errors occur in the message received.

In order to combat the errors, checking bits are added. Thus, for each batch of ones and zeros, an extra one or zero is added to give the sum of the preceding digits (we are in binary here, so 0+1 = 1 and 1+1 = 0) so that errors in the batch can be detected. This works, of course, but adds a degree of redundancy to our otherwise ideal language.

The problems multiply, of course, as distance and noise increase, and more sophisticated error checking is needed. However, this is the basis of our modern communication networks – even in a computer network redundancy is rife because it has to be to spot errors.

The other thing that happened was what is usually known in the history of philosophy as ‘the turn to language’. This was mainly due to the influence of Wittgenstein’s late work, Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001 [1953])). In this book (which is a difficult and unusual read, by the way) Wittgenstein notes the variety of uses of language, not all of which are giving information.

The wide variety of uses of language Wittgenstein lists include giving and acting on orders, reporting an event, making up a story and reading it, translating, requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying, among many others (PI section 23). His point is that speaking a language is part of an activity, of what he calls a life form. Here we cannot get away from the fact that the way we live life, and the language we use to describe life and act within it are not separate.

The words usually used to describe this intertwining of language and life is, perhaps unfortunately in English, ‘language game’. This might lend it a slightly frivolous air especially as Wittgenstein goes on to discuss the different sorts of activities that the word ‘game’ covers. But the point is a serious one: our different activities entail the use of different sub-sets of our language.

Consider, by way of an example, a zoologist taking their toddler child to a wildlife park and looking at a giraffe. The zoologist will see things differently from the toddler. The child will see a big animal with spots and a long neck. The zoologist will see adaptation to a savanna environment, and to eating leave on trees out of reach of other herbivores. The giraffe is the same for both people, but the interpretation is different, because of their different life experiences.

The point is that while the two people might explain what they saw in different words, the differences arise from their different contexts, the different environments and experience that a toddler and a trained scientist have had. It does not mean that the truth is subjective, that they both have a different truth about giraffes. The truths they have are compatible, just not the same.

Our different language games are not, therefore, incompatible. A zoologist can understand their child’s description of the giraffe, and the child, if taken slowly and carefully through the new ideas they may be presented with, can understand the zoologist’s description. Both are being honest about what they have seen and describing it accurately. Naturally, there may be issues when the child describes a lion instead of a giraffe, or the zoologist turns out to be a creationist with a non-mainstream description of how a long neck came about. But in general language works because both sides are honest, and misunderstandings can be dealt with by mutual goodwill and explanation.

The point here is that language is not, as most of us understand, experience and use it, totally transparent. For normal purposes we do not consider how language works – we just use it. But when we stop and think about it, language gets more complex. It starts to shape the world around us because part of that world is a human construct. For example, if we start saying that a formalised homosexual relationship is marriage, and people object, what the argument is over is the meaning of marriage. Whatever else it might be, marriage is a human condition, a human construct. Its meanings are what we make of them, as individuals and as society.

 Language, therefore, is not as transparent as we might like to think. An awful lot of meaning is driven by the context in which the words are delivered. When we start to think about it like that, we might start to be surprised that we can make sense to each other at all.


Saturday, June 13, 2020

Baber’s Trinity

Trinity Sunday is possibly one of the most feared dates in the Christian year. It is so easy to be heretical about the Trinity – to fall into polytheism, tri-theism, Sabellism, or any one of a plethora of heresies that await the unwary. And, when it comes to the Trinity, we are all unwary. On the upside, it is unlikely that we will, in our blundering around, come up with a really new heresy. There does not seem to have been a decent original one for fifteen hundred years or so.

Nevertheless, it does behove us to try. I was once told off in a systematic theology class for ‘playing the mystery card too early’. If we bunk off from the difficult questions, then the easier questions also become more difficult and we regress into an infantile religiosity. So we do need to try.

I have been reading Harriet Baber’s new(-ish) book:

Baber, H., The Trinity: A Philosophical Investigation (London: SCM, 2019).

As the title suggests, this is more a philosophical study than a theological one, although part of the point of the book is, I suspect, to show that really there is not much difference between the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Indeed, one of Baber’s targets seems to be ‘religious studies’ academics, those who study religions but who do not get involved. To such people ‘theology’ is odious, a holdover from the dark ages. Religious studies is a social science, a true academic subject, while theology is just uncritical expounding of dogma (p.3).

There is also, as again Baber notes and articulates what I have suspected, that there is an understanding that unbelievers do not need to concern themselves with theology, especially with difficult ideas such as the Trinity. Of course, the concept might not be important to them as a cornerstone of their belief system, but surely there has to be a requirement on everyone to tackle, reasonably intelligently, the past, and religion, and arguments over Christian doctrines, do form a part of that past. We neglect it at our peril.

Baber divides her argument into two – the ‘Latin’ and the ‘Greek’ questions on the Trinity. This paradigm dates back to the 1892 work of Theodore de Regnon, SJ, who characterised the Latin tradition as emphasising the unity of God while the Greek tradition emphasises the Persons as distinct centres of consciousness participating in a divine society, the so-called ‘social Trinity’ (p. 45).

The de Regnon paradigm, as it has become known, has been broadly accepted, at least by analytic philosophers interested in the Trinity (p. 46). Some scepticism is expressed, however, that there is such a clear distinction. The questions seem to be more about the language used and the meanings expressed rather than different theologies of the Trinity.

Baber suggests that the investigation of the Trinity should address the Latin and Greek questions: ‘How are the Trinitarian Persons distinguished?’ and ‘What makes them one God?’ (p. 60). Baber’s aim is to find some sorts of answers to these questions without, it seems, giving hostages to concepts of ‘Social Trinity’, particularly as it is often found (apparently) as being used as a paradigm for some sort of perfect human society in political theology.

The discussion gets undeniably technical, but the bottom line Baber draws seems clear: the Athanasian Creed declares that the Father is God, the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God; that the Father is not the Son and the Father is not the Holy Spirit. The Persons of the Trinity are not identical, they do not have the same properties, but they are all God (p. 110). Anyone, believer or not, must see that there is some philosophical and theological work to be done here.

Baber comes to the conclusion that the Latin question elicits a Latin answer: the Trinitarian processions (of the Son and Holy Spirit) are to be understood as discerning relations, that is, they are how we distinguish one Person of the Trinity from another. The Greek question obtains a Greek answer: the processions are relations of ontological dependence, best understood as grounding relations. These answers avoid what is worst (or heretical0 in either camps, while not exactly presenting the same answer to the question posed by the doctrine of the Trinity.

Baber’s point is that we should not look backwards to some pre-existing human answers to the questions posed by the Trinity. The Fathers of the fourth century did not have special access to the divine essence to work out the Creeds; they did not, as Ian Ramsey notes, telephone CHALcedon 451 for the latest updates on the Godhead. The Scholastics were not, and did not think they were, writing definitive conclusions about God. Baber suggests that current philosophical and theological work should build on previous work but not be held to ransom by it (p.185-6). Their context was different from ours.

We should, therefore, start from current theological praxis and modern philosophy. The foundations of any investigation for Baber should be the discourse and praxis of the church, that is, what we as ordinary church-goers say and do. The liturgy, hymnody, art, customs, practices, religious objects and devotions together constitute the Christian religion and its practice. The aim of philosophical theology is to make sense of all of this and to avoid, (so far as is possible, I would add) logical incoherence (p. 186-7). This, Baber asserts, tells us all we can know about the supernatural world, and that is what religion is about.

This raises a number of questions. There are, after all, varying practices and discourses in the church, let alone among the faiths of the human race. How do we choose one to be the starting point of our reflections on the Christian religion and its practice? Most of us, most of the time, would take our practice as the starting point, but that surely begs the question. While, pace Kierkegaard, being born in a Christian country does not make you a Christian, nor does being born in a Christian family. Being thus born, however, may well inform your practices and your understanding of where you stand. It does give a solid starting point, but can we really question it?


Friday, June 5, 2020

Knowing that We Know

We all know stuff. Some of it is the obvious sort of things that we do not even think about, such as ‘If I don’t put this foot down I will fall over’. Other stuff we know we do think about; this is perhaps the things we learnt at school, such as ‘Henry VIII had six wives’ or ‘the square root of 64 is 8.’ Sometimes we have to think about it, or ransack our memories for the answer (say to the question ‘what were Henry VIII’s wives called?’).

The things that we know divide, then, into two classes, at least roughly. The things which we know automatically, such as catching a ball or riding a bicycle, and the things we have to think about. Granted, originally, we had to learn to catch a ball or ride a bike, but once we have done so, we can pretty well think of other things, so long as nothing unexpected happens.

The thing is that while many of us can ride a bike, swim or undertake a myriad of other activities, we are likely to struggle to explain how we come to do them. We can show someone how to ride a bike by riding a bike in front of them. We can explain that you pedal and hold the handlebars, and even that moving forward helps stability and steering, but we cannot explain exactly how a bike is ridden. We know how to ride a bike, but we cannot tell how to ride a bike.

A fair bit of life is like this, I suspect. We watch a TV chef rustle up a fabulous (looking, at least) dish out of a few dubious looking vegetables and the breast of a woodcock, without a recipe or, apparently, any idea of what the final product will look or taste like. They know what they are doing. This is experience, granted, but also some slightly mysterious knowledge that we cannot quite define; perhaps ‘intuition’ might be used to describe it.

The upshot of this is that, if you think about it a bit, we know far more than we can tell. This is not, by the way, original to me. The chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi observed this a fair time ago, in his book Personal Knowledge, among other works (Polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962)). The critical philosophy in the sub-title refers, I think, to the ideas of Kant and his critical philosophy.

I have already given some illustrations of this principle; there are many more. In a more technical sense, there was a time when I could tell whether a vacuum system was leaking from the sound of the pumps. A pump evacuating a chamber which is leaking makes a different sound from a pump which is maintaining a vacuum at a certain low pressure. I can tell you that much, but how the sounds differ is a matter of experience: the pitch of the pump with the leaky system is lower as the pump is working harder. How much lower and how you know whether it is significant or important is a matter of practice and knowing the system and that means that you have to attend to the noises that the pump makes under various conditions, not just read off the pressure from the gauge.

My personal knowledge will differ from your personal knowledge. Our experience and what we have attended to are different, even if we grew up in the same country, trained in the same subjects and so on. That does not mean, however, that our knowledge is entirely subjective. ‘It works for me’ only goes so far. After all, murdering someone might work for me, but it certainly will not work for the other person, or for the criminal justice system. We actually have to agree on a great number of things before we hold a conversation about things we might not agree over.

One of Polanyi’s problems with the scientific world is that science (by which we mean physical science here) makes facts impersonal. The scientific world agrees, for example, that the Schrodinger equation gives a reasonable description, under many circumstances, of how the atomic-scale world works. That knowledge is held by the scientific community, somehow. It is in the courses on physics you might undertake at university, it is in the textbooks and so on.

What is often not observed, but is also true, is that the Schrodinger equation is also, and most importantly, in the mind of those physicists who use it to solve problems. It is they who write down the equation, who add the boundary conditions for the given problem they are trying to solve and attempt to obtain the answers that they want. How to do this can only be partially taught. Some of it is personal knowledge – it is why when learning a subject you have to do lots of boring exercises, to build up your personal knowledge of the subject.

One of the things it is a bit difficult to convince young researchers of is that when they come to defend their thesis, they are the world experts on the subject (or they should be). Of course, they will not feel like it, but the examiners are not strictly speaking experts. My internal examiner told be over coffee on the day of my viva that I should expect some stupid questions: ‘Not because we are trying to trick you or trap you, but because we do not know.’ I had the personal knowledge of the subject; I had done the experiments, examined the data, analysed the results and written every word of the thesis. The knowledge gained was at least partly expressed in the thesis, but only partly. I also knew what a leaky vacuum system sounded like, and this was not an explicit part of the examination.

The danger is that we then start assuming all knowledge is personal and thus everything is subjective, or relative to the individual. That is, of course, as untrue as the claim that the only things we know are publicly available facts. But that discussion is for another time.

 

 


Friday, May 29, 2020

Believing Everything Or Nothing

As we have possibly seen so far (and the examples can be multiplied, of course) truth is a difficult, although not impossible, thing to seek. Truth is probably more elusive than science would have us believe, but hopefully is less elusive that some of the extreme versions of postmodernism that exist would have us think.

In the previous posts we have travelled a long way in one sense, but not very far in another. We have suggested, for example, that science does not lead us towards the truth particularly more than any other subject, because the truthfulness of science, or at least physics, depends on an arbitrary metaphysical truth that, say, forces used in calculation are ‘real’. While this is generally accepted to be the case, we have to concede that it is not necessarily so.

Another approach, which appeals to some minds, is to doubt everything. The master of this was Descartes, who doubted everything and anything until he came to something he could not doubt. The presentations of his senses, famously, were doubted, as he could be a brain in a vat and the sensations could be being fed to him by an evil demon for its own amusement. Memory also plays us false, as we know. It is well known that Descartes came up with the idea that what could not be doubted was the fact of his thinking ‘I think therefore I am’.

This expression (or its Latin form: cogito ergo sum) has resonated down the philosophical centuries. Some have accepted it, some rejected it, and some tried to modify it. Hence we can find criticisms that Descartes, in fact, assumed too much. Perhaps, it is suggested, Descartes could only say ‘There is thinking going on’ – the cogito assumes the identity of the thinker. Again, perhaps, as someone once suggested to me, he lacked enough doubt, and should have said ‘I think I think, therefore I think I am, I think’. But maybe we are looking through the wrong end of the telescope here.

The physical sciences rather follow Descartes’ method. Nothing is accepted except what can be shown to be the case. Reductionism (for that is what the physical sciences do) aims to reduce things to their components, understand them and then reconstruct the original, more complex structure. It sort of works; we can try to understand an electron in free space, and then an electron in an atom. The two in fact behave very differently, and so reductionism only sort of works. But we can proceed to atoms as a whole, molecules and hence organisms. At each level, however, extra phenomena occur which cannot be explained by the components of that level alone. Hence biology is biology and not a branch of chemistry; chemistry is chemistry and not a branch of physics.

The other issue with Descartes is that we do not actually strip most things down to their essentials, or to things we cannot doubt. As children we learn from the things we see, hear, touch, smell, and taste and so on. We do not doubt what is presented to our senses and work on how they fit together – that which glows is hot for example, or that knives are sharp and can hurt. Reductionism only takes us so far.

The other end of the telescope to peer down is perhaps best described by Newman: ‘I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing everything that is offered tour senses, than it is our duty to doubt of everything’ (Newman, J. H., An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Assumption Press, 2013 [1870]) p. 246, or p. 377 in the original).Newman argues that believing everything until shown otherwise is the true way of learning – we discover the truth and discard errors along the way. Thus a child on a train might discover that when they stick their thumb in their mouth the lights go out as the train enters a tunnel. Repeated experiments may convince the child that the original observation was a coincidence.

Newman’s point is thus at the opposite end of seeking truth than Descartes’. Our senses are, on the whole reliable, according to Newman and we can arrive at decent understandings of that which is the case via them. Descartes disagrees: our senses, which can be unreliable, therefore cannot be relied upon and we have to find another basis for our beliefs and ability to live in the world. Descartes has to seek a ‘bridge’, a means of getting from the reliable ‘in here’ self to the real ‘out there’ world without using the senses. His answer, famously, is God who is ultimately reliable.

Newman’s point is, perhaps backed up by Plantinga who argues that there is an evolutionary reason why our senses are reliable. Our sensing of human-scale objects is, on the whole, reliable. After all, if early man had to consider the reliability of her senses before running away from the sabre-toothed tiger, they would probably have been a lot fewer early people around. Similarly, if we had to justify every memory of a large cat type creature with big teeth before recognising it as a sabre-toothed tiger and taking appropriate action, the tiger would have been far better fed. As Plantinga comments ‘Beliefs about where I was yesterday are ordinarily far more likely to be true than the latest high-powered scientific theories.’ (Plantinga, A., Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Nature, and Naturalism (Oxford: OUP, 2011), p. 313).

The point is this: at human scales, our senses, memories and so on are likely to be reliable, and we tend to assume they are (even Descartes ate and drank without too much interrogation) . If they prove not to be we are surprised and might seek a reason – a cleverly drawn picture, for example, is an optical illusion. When we spot the way it is drawn, we have an explanation. At the scales of the very big and very small or very complex (galaxies, atoms, the internal workings of organisms, for example) our senses prove to be inadequate and need augmenting. That is not the fault of our senses, because in day to day life the very big, very small and internal do not worry us particularly.


Saturday, May 23, 2020

Postmodernism and Relativism


‘It is,’ some folk will say, ‘all relative.’ This is something to do with the zeitgeist, the spirit of the age, rather vaguely deriving from an almost equally amorphous movement in modern thought, postmodernity. The usual understanding of the postmodern is that there are no over-arching narratives which are valid. Thus, for example, the late Victorian idea of ‘progress’ is dismissed as imperialism, colonialism and anti-environmental industrialisation which exploited the poor, rather than raise them from poverty. The ideas of ‘progress’, ‘empire’, ‘improvement’ and so on become relativized, along the lines of ‘if it works for you then do it (or believe it)’.

There are a number of issues that arise here, more than could possibly be encompassed in a text of this nature, but let me have a go at starting, at least. Firstly, I think we need to separate postmodernity (or, if you prefer, ‘late modernity’) from pure relativism. Relativism is quite easy to show to be fallacious. There are, after all, plenty of counter-examples to the assertion that everything is relative: try driving your car along the wrong side of the road and see what your insurers, other motorists and the law enforcement officers think of your claim that it is all relative and therefore you were doing nothing wrong. Or consider adding two and two and making five, because the answer is relative and if you believe it strongly enough it will be true.

The silly examples, of course, are simply reflections that the world is not relative at all, and that that is not what postmodern means. The assertion of relativism, ‘it is all relative’ is in fact self-stultifying. If everything is relative, then the statement ‘it is all relative’ is also relative, and therefore is as groundless as the next statement. I may believe that it is all relative, but in fact, I believe that everything is relative except the proposition that ‘it is all relative’. Why should you, or I, or anyone, privilege that statement among all the others?

Pure relativism therefore, does not work and cannot work. Postmodernism, however, is a lot more complex and really does not affect our chances of being right or finding the truth. What, in this context at least, postmodernism does do is indicate that truth is a lot harder to find, a lot more difficult to be sure about, than we might once have thought as a society.

It is very easy to criticise historians of a previous age. They found a set of documents in an archive and read what they said and reported it as fact, or at least, as ‘what happened.’ They asked questions of their sources in what today might seem like a rather naïve manner. Of course, they asked questions from their own context, such as ‘How did Great Britain come to rule the world?’ This is not a question which would arise in our own context, where Great Britain clearly does not rule the world, but from the viewpoint of the 1930s, or 1900s or similar, the truth of the standpoint was more or less unquestionable.

Our context therefore does condition the questions we can ask and the answers we can found. Classical scholars, for example, have spent some effort in recovering ideas of homosexuality in the ancient world. This was not done before, even though works like Plato’s ‘Symposium’ were clearly known about. Homosexuality was, however, legally suppressed in many countries (in the UK until the 1950s, I think) and so no-one interrogated the sources with questions about homosexuality in mind.

In a similar vein, it is often reported that the Athenians, both male and female, exercised in the gymnasium naked. Now it may well be that I am naïve here, being no classical historian, but often it is reported with a degree of frisson, or at least as a note to get people interested in the Ancient Greeks. It was not until I (reluctantly) started to take some exercise that I realised what seems to be the true reason for nude gymnastics: Greece is a hot country, and exercise makes you sweat. Sweaty clothes smell. Therefore, if your culture and environment allow it, exercising naked saves washing clothes.  

Whether that is correct or not, it illustrates my point. The questions we can ask depend on our context. Without taking some exercise the point about sweaty clothes would not have occurred to me. Because my context changed, I could ask the question and find some sort of answer. The Greeks were not necessarily parading naked bodies around for fun, but to save effort. In that context, who can blame them?

In this sense, then, our view of the past is mediated by our present. We ask questions that our grandparents could not have done. We can read their answers to the questions they did ask, of course, and agree or disagree with their answers, but in doing so we ask questions of their context and understandings from our own. On this basis, we see the past through a complex of lenses, not ‘as it was’.

Physical science does not work like that. The questions asked are contextually driven, but the answers we obtain are not usually accepted to be driven by what we want to find out about. As Richard Feynman once observed ‘Nature cannot be fooled.’ We might want to travel to the furthest stars, but physics, at least as we know it, does not permit it. We might make discoveries about the physical world which might permit interstellar travel, but they will also encompass our current theories and experimental results about the universe.  Einstein’s relativity theories did not replace Newton’s laws; they encompass them as low energy approximations. Quantum mechanics did not replace dynamics, it encompasses it as what happens at large scales. You cannot negotiate with the laws of nature as you might be able to argue against a historical hypothesis.

Postmodernity then, in its less silly forms, is not opposed to us finding the truth, nor does it claim that truth is impossible to find. It simply observes that finding the truth is hard and contingent.

Contemporary Theology

What, you might well ask, is contemporary theology and why does it matter? I have been reading MacGregor, K. R., Contemporary Theology: A ...