Saturday, December 25, 2021

The Ground of Morality

The English philosopher John Locke is well known for arguing that we have no innate ideas. That is, we are not born with any ideas of our own, we develop them as we develop. This yields a problem for morality, in that society needs a population with a moral outlook and behaviour, but there is no innate understanding of what that might be.

Locke, thus, needs morality, in the form of laws and ideas about duty and good, to come from somewhere. For him, that somewhere is God. Duty cannot be understood without a law, and a law must have a lawgiver. Since the human race is not born with laws, the lawgiver must be outside the human race and must, therefore be God (Locke, 2014 [1690], pp. I, 3, 12).

This of course leads to another problem, in that to ground morality we need to prove the existence of God. This was not too much of a difficulty to Locke, given the society he was living in, but is more of a problem for us. According to Locke we are intelligent dependent beings under the direction of God. We cannot be independent because then we would have no law.

There is a gulf here between Locke and more recent ideas of morality. Recent accounts of humans argue that we are independent individuals, and our moral standards are those which we have chosen. Locke would argue that such a project, to choose our morality and live by it, is doomed from the start. We are politically autonomous, in that we cannot be governed without our consent, but not morally autonomous, and nor would it be desirable for us to believe we were (Locke, 2006, p. 45).

Atheism, therefore, is a problem for Locke, but is, of course, rife in society today. According to Locke there cannot be any grounds for morality as a consequence of this. We simply act as we see fit, having chosen our moral rules. If we look around the world today, we can perhaps see the consequences of this in, perhaps, senior politicians imposing rules on the population while ignoring them themselves. This makes perfect sense if you have chosen a morality that exempts you from obeying rules and if you are in a position not to be caught breaking the ones you have imposed on other.

The problem is that this approach can say nothing about anything being actually right or wrong. An action only fits or does not fit with my chosen set of moral rules, and given that they are my set of rules, I can change them as I wish. The fact that others are forced to obey some rules other than their own is due to the coercive power of the state. If I am in a position to avoid detection and punishment by the state then I can ignore the rules which others cannot.

The philosophical problem here is the objectivity of morality. By this we mean that if behaving in a certain way is right, then that way must be findable by everyone. That is morality, being good, goodness itself must be ‘out there’. Otherwise, our morality is just that, ours, and it is ‘in here’ that is, a matter of my choice as to what I think is right or good to do.

Philosophers have a hard time proving anything is objective. Everything passes though our minds before we perceive it, and so there is no good reason to believe that anything exists. This is the sort of problem that gets philosophy a bad name, admittedly, but it does throw up a problem which is usually ignored in everyday life. I walk around the furniture because it is there, but my perception of the chair is not that simple.

If we have a problem with material objects in the world, we are clearly going to have an even worse problem with non-material objects. So, things like God and morality, being, by definition, not things in the world, are going to have a hard time being proved to exist. I cannot prove the chair I am sitting on exists or continues to exist if I leave the room. How on earth am I to prove that the good exists?

Critical realism can come to our help here, at least partially. We do not have reasons to doubt the existence of the chair, or its continued existence when I am not in the room. There might be some unusual circumstances which might cause the chair to no longer exist when I return, but these would be exactly that – unusual circumstances. Perhaps the chair was destroyed because I left it too close to the fire. There are explanations as to why the chair might not be there, but they suggest unusual occurrences.

Many people would say that morality exists and that they follow it, at least most of the time. Most people would claim that they seek the good for everyone, at least most of the time, while admitting that often there are conflicting claims about what the good is, exactly. That does not make morality objective, admittedly, but it might at least suggest that morality and the good are available to most people if they seek it. We live among real people in real situations, making real decision about what is right or best to do.

The problem is, as Irish Murdoch seems to have noted, is that to make decisions about what to do for the good, we must see things clearly. By things I mean other people as well as objects in the world and (in these days of climate crisis) the world in its fullness. We have to navigate the world by seeing clearly, even if we see the world through pictures or metaphors. Otherwise, we live in a fantasy world of our own creation, in which case we can choose our morality to suit us and ignore the reality of other people and their lives.

 

References

 

Locke, J. (2006). An Essay Concerning Toleration and Other Writings on Law and Politics 1667-1683. Oxford: OUP.

Locke, J. (2014 [1690]). Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ware: Wordsworth.

 

Saturday, December 11, 2021

The Retrieval of Virtue

Alasdair MacIntyre starts After Virtue with a parable, taken from a post-Second Word War science fiction novel, where a catastrophe has befallen the world and science has disappeared, leaving only a few scraps of text books strewn around, which are carefully collected and preserved. No-one, however, can bring the bits together and restart science.

The point MacIntyre is making is that something similar has happened to ethical thinking and moral philosophy. There is no such thing as doing the right thing for the sake of it being right anymore. Morality, such as it is, is based on rights and they are, at heart, related to power and holding resources, and therefore, ultimately, to the threat of the use of violence.

It was not ever thus, the argument suggests. In previous centuries morality was related to virtue and vices. Since, perhaps, the late Nineteenth Century, moral philosophy had moved away from doing the right thing to arguments which, basically, suggest that the only approach is to choose your precepts, state them and try to stick by them consistently. There is no ground for morals; there are only choices.

This sort of approach can be found in logical positivism. The Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic it is at least strongly implied that moral philosophy (along with other things like theology) is meaningless. Logical positivism insists that statements, to be meaningful, should be verifiable or tautologies. ‘All single men are bachelors’ is acceptable as a tautology. ‘The far side of the Moon has impact craters’ is also acceptable, even though we cannot see the far side of the Moon, because it is verifiable in principle.

However, ‘Murder is wrong’ or ‘Mass killing of Jews is evil’ are not acceptable statements under logical positivism. They are formally meaningless, at best only saying ‘I don’t like murder’. Ayer’s book was published in the 1930s and rapidly took hold in academic circles; few people could manage an argument against it. The problem was that it has nothing to say about, say, the Holocaust. We can only not like it, according to this account.

Most people would think that response inadequate. The interesting question is ‘what can be put in its place?’ And here we have a problem because the framework of logical positivism is an all-encompassing one. A statement such as ‘Herding people onto cattle trucks to take them to extermination is evil’ has no grip on the world, according to logical positivism.

A different response is called for, and this was suggested by four women educated at Oxford before and just after World War Two: Phillipa Foot, Elizabeth Anscombe, Mary Midgley, and Irish Murdoch. The choice theory of moral philosophy was widespread and follows from logical positivism. If all a statement about moral right and wrong is a statement about how I feel, then all I need to do is choose the right things that I feel good about (or bad about) and state them. There can be no argument about them, at the end of the day, because they are my free choice.

The attitude regarding your moral outlook as a free choice is, at heart, the view of the individual as a romantic hero, as Murdoch observed. The universe is meaningless, just a collection of scientific facts and tautologous statements. The individual chooses to imbue their lives with meaning and morality. The hero stands alone against the facts of the universe, the empty pointlessness of life and the fact that it will soon be extinguished whatever choices are made. This attitude is still widespread; Lipscombe quotes Richard Dawkins as holding it (he calls it the ‘Dawkins Sublime’).

If morality is simply a matter of choice, then there can be no arguments about who is right and wrong. For example, if I choose to think that abortion is always wrong, but that executing criminals guilty of heinous crimes is right, then no-one can argue that my views are inconsistent. I could come back and say my views are not inconsistent – one regards the unborn and therefore innocent, the other adults who carried out, say, a premeditated murder. But that indicates that moral argument is possible. I can claim my views are not inconsistent; you can argue that as both actions take a life, to be consistent I must oppose the death penalty as well as abortion. My free choice of my morality is not quite as free as I thought.

Therefore, there are other constraints regarding how we construct our moral universes. It is not just a free for all, a free choice. Society, for example, constrains what I can and cannot do. Most people think that stealing something is wrong. There is little argument about that; only exceptions for cases of extreme need – a loving parent might be excused for stealing food for their starving child. Morality and meaning are not just matters of our choosing. We are not the romantic heroes of the Dawkins Subline.

In fact, quite a lot of the things we know and believe to be the case are not verifiable or tautologies. Science, while it does proceed by a principle of verification, does not really do so by stating hypotheses and then testing them. It is a nice simple way of viewing science and progress, but the reality is a lot messier than that. If logical positivism does not work for science, then we really cannot posit that it works for anything else. How could a child verify that their parents love them? How can I verify that you will meet me at St Pancras station, under the clock, at five PM tomorrow?

In essence, we do not stand alone against a meaningless universe, and we do not determine our own moral views. People who do tend to get found out, one way or another. Although the moral code of humanity, or a nation or society might not be spelt out, and there are always grey areas, those who transgress undefined but specific boundaries often land up paying some sort of price for that. They might have chosen their own rules, but they have to be close enough to everyone else’s for them to count as ethical.

Saturday, November 27, 2021

Emergent Multiverses

I have now finished reading:

Wallace, D. (2012). The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum theory According to the Everett Interpretation. Oxford: OUP.

In keeping with my self-proposed rule of reading things you disagree with, I managed to get through to the end of this lengthy and in places very technical book. You do need a background in quantum physics (which I have) as well as probability (sort of) and philosophy of science, especially physics (umm…). Anyway, we got there.

The question then is ‘was I convinced?’ Do I now see universes (even ‘local’ universes, whatever that means) popping into existence whenever a cat is placed in a box with a radioactive source?

No.

I think there are questions, some of which I outlined before. To take the answered one first: what about Ockham’s razor? This states that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily. The answer from Wallace is that this is true but according to the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics each extra universe is necessary, therefore Ockham’s razor does not apply.

As an argument that is acceptable, of course, but it does rather beg the question as to the reality of the universes popping into existence on a very frequent basis, even if the frequency is uncountable. If the interpretation is correct, the razor is not applied, but the ‘if’ is a big one.

The unanswered question is about where the energy comes from to create a universe. A universe, even a local one, is a big thing with a lot of matter and energy. To duplicate it exactly except for one particular facet will take an equal quantity of energy, and so on for all the uncountable multitudes of universes which appear. Somewhere this uncountable quantity of energy has to be found. The conservation of energy is a well known law of science and even quantum mechanics managed to obey it, only bending the rule slightly and temporarily.

The question of energy, therefore, is unanswered and I think it needs an answer before the emergent multiverses idea could be accepted.

The rest of the book seems to be mainly a defence of the emergent multiverses idea along the lines that it does not do any worse than any other theory of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. For example, one of the bones of contention over the multiverse theory is something to do with probability. I suspect it is something like that in the multiverse theory there is no objective probability because all outcomes occur, just with greater of lesser numbers of branches available. Someone who experiences a branch will land up in one of the subsequent branches with a probability given by the number of branches which are possible with that outcome.

There may well be problems with the philosophy of probability. I am sure there are, but just to argue that the multiverse universe does no worse when subject to those problems than any other interpretation is hardly a strong argument in favour of the theory. It might remove an objection, but that does not make it correct.

The consequences of the choice of metaphysics that one takes to be behind quantum mechanics and its interpretation are rather few. Semi-conductors, for example, work weather or not you think every time a P-N junction triggers gives another parallel universe where it does not. One argument put forward for the usefulness of multiverses is it is helpful in calculations (although I have not seen one where it is used) but that is not evidence for reality. In solid state physics it is useful to calculate using electrons of negative mass. That does not mean that anyone believes they exist. Even if multiverses are helpful computationally or conceptually, that does not mean they exist either.

There is a question floating around as well as to whether or not emergent multiverses are science or metaphysics or mere speculation. The problem here is that scientific theories, in order to be counted as such, need to be testable. That is, you need to be able to conduct an experiment to verify (or not) the hypothesis. So far as I know there is no suggested verification experiment possible for emergent multiverses. There is a lot of speculation about finding wormholes and practicing time travel (really) but none of these seem to be a practical experimental set-up. Towards the end of the book Wallace does seem to rely a bit heavily on science fiction for ideas and explanations of what he is discussing. I am sure that there are good scientific bases for it (to a point) but quoting fiction, no matter how ‘serious’ it is, is hardly going to prove the point.

As I mentioned before, the most likely explanation for the issues we find around quantum mechanics are likely to be found, in my opinion, in the fact that we are limited, macro-scale, beings and quantum mechanics deals with the unimaginably small. At the scale of atoms and electrons, things are different from what we experience ourselves. Our expectations are not going to be met, no matter what they might be. We can verify an awful lot of the theory of quantum mechanics, granted, to perhaps surprising levels of accuracy, given the probabilistic nature of the theory. But that does not and cannot mean that we can take things like wavefunction collapse and the Schrödinger's cat thought experiment as being seriously real. They are parts of our discussions and conceptual equipment around quantum physics. Taking the collapse of a superposed wavefunction to mean that the entire universe splits into two seems to be taking realism and faith in our models of the very, very small far too much for granted.

As wise physicist (I forget whom) once commented that not only is quantum physics stranger than we imagine, it is stranger than we can imagine. Talk of multiplying universes at the drop of a quantum hat really does not add any clarity, I suspect. Quantum mechanics is a human level theory, which is extremely accurate in what it does (most of the time). To claim that it is so good that the universe has to multiply itself repeated to follow it seems to be imbuing it with a great metaphysical burden which I doubt it can carry.

Saturday, November 13, 2021

Realism and Physical Laws

Are you a realist about the laws of nature? Most people, I would warrant, would not know how to answer the question, which is fair enough. It is only physicists and philosophers of science who tend to worry about such things. But it is, at least, a bit interesting.

The question is whether we think that a physical law is correct and really describes the world, or whether a law is a relation inhering in the world. The difference is in the words ‘inhere’ and ‘describe’. A view in which the laws describe the world can be traced back the David Hume, the Scottish Empiricist. A law which inheres in the world is a metaphysical entity which controls the world.

Most people, including most physicists, do not worry about the difference too much. But taking the laws of nature as inhering in the world can lead to some odd sorts of effects in our thinking. Hence, we can start to believe that every time a quantum event occurs in a way that affects the macroscopic universe (a cat in a box with a phial of poison which opens when a radioactive decay occurs) the universe splits into two, and we go down one branch or another (the cat is, when we look at it, alive, or dead, but not both).

If we take the view that laws of nature only describe the universe to us, there is less of a problem with unknowable branching universes. In a sense, it seems to me, the Humean version of physical laws are a bit more humble than metaphysical laws of nature. In the Humean case, what matters is the description of the universe as it appears to us. We might be grasping at each advance of science towards a better understanding of what is going on, but each step is not getting at a final truth, but simply a better understanding.

I think there might be an analogy with theology here; indeed, some authors about the problems surrounding quantum mechanics reach for God-like beings to give a total explanation of the theory. But that is not accessible to us as limited humans. Ian Ramsey once noted that the early Church Fathers were giving the best descriptions they could of the Godhead, but they were not dialling Chalcedon 451 for updates on the Trinity every week and writing it down. Human descriptions of the Trinity are exactly that: human descriptions of the indescribable in human terms.

We can see, perhaps, that we might be over-egging our quantum pudding by claiming that quantum mechanics gives a complete description of the quantum scale. Quantum Mechanics gives rise to some paradoxes, grated, but the paradoxes are human paradoxes, grounded on our ignorance of what is really going on at the quantum scale (the very, very small), in a similar way to Trinitarian theology, which is grounded on our ignorance of what is going on in the Godhead.

Therefore, when physicists or philosophers of science come up with ideas like the multiple emerging universes of branching quantum mechanics and argue (quite coherently, admittedly) that this is all fine and no counterargument can really stand against it, we have the right to be a little sceptical. Quantum mechanics might be the best theory we have which describes the micro-world, but that does not mean it is giving us the constraints that the micro-world acts under. Just because it is correct (i.e., gives accurate predictions) does not mean that quantum mechanics is a metaphysical entity controlling the world.

Again, caution is suggested by the analogy with Trinitarian theology. Just because something is a deduction from an idea about the Trinity, does not mean that the deduction is right. Theology works with a host of images and metaphors for God and the Godhead. Running one of them to death is liable to land the theologian in heresy. Similarly, running one idea of quantum mechanics to death is liable to land the philosopher of science in a but of a muddle, claiming that, for example, each time the cat is placed in a box and is later observed, the universe splits into two identical universes, one with a live cat and the other with a dead one.

The quantum world is a great deal weirder than we can imagine, I think. We do not know what it is like to ‘be’ and electron. How does an electron experience a magnetic field and emitting photons by moving through it? We have no idea. To claim that we do have is to argue that quantum mechanics is an absolute, cast-iron physical law. In fact, I would suggest, quantum mechanics is simply a human language construct (that language being mathematics, of course) which predictions which can be experimentally verified as being reasonably (and certainly usefully) accurate.

If this is correct, then arguments about multiple emerging universes start to look a little superfluous. The problems which such theories claim to solve – the relation between the Schrodinger equation and the Born rule, one being a solvable wave equation and the other being probabilistic, dissolves. It is simply the result of having to use two bits of a human construct to explain what we see.

Similarly, the problem of wavefunction collapse vanishes as well, I think. This is the issue that before we look in the box, the cat exists in a superposition of states – it is either alive or dead. When we make an observation, it is either one or the other, the wavefunction as suddenly collapsed into one state. The question is then asked about how the collapse happens, physically. The answer is that it does not happen, because the collapse of the wavefunction is something that emerges from the human level description of the universe. It does not necessarily happen in the quantum level because the quantum level is inaccessible to us.

Quantum mechanics is quite weird enough, it seems to me, not to require additional counter-intuitive ideas to further complicate matters. While emergent universes might not be ruled out specifically by the theories of quantum mechanics, they are an unnecessary and, perhaps, rather arrogant addition to the laws of nature. We simply do not know what is happening at the quantum level; that knowledge is unavailable to us.

 

Saturday, October 30, 2021

Wittgensteinian Fideism?

The question mark seems to be apposite. Neither term in the title here is in common circulation, so before discussing the content of this book:

Nielsen, K., & Phillips, D. Z. (2005). Wittgensteinian Fideism? London: SCM.

I think unpacking the title might be an idea.

To start from the end, ‘fideism’. According to Penelhum, fideists argue that faith does not need the support of argument, and therefore reject the approach of philosophical defenders of faith who try to show that faith is compatible with reason, scientific knowledge, and so on. Faith, on this view, need not be rational. There are some venerable names in this tradition: Tertullian and Kierkegaard, for example, although their positions still can be defended on philosophical grounds.

In fideism, the key is a state of trust and commitment to God, not to some doctrine or argument about God. We reject, as sinful beings, signs of God’s presence revealed to us, and think that only human powers are the cure for human ills. Reason and science require detachment; faith requires a passionate involvement. Faith requires rebirth and submission; without these God remains hidden from us.

The’ Wittgensteinian’ bit of the title refers, of course, to the Twentieth Century philosopher Wittgenstein, and, more specifically here, to his idea of language games. Wittgenstein’s own relationship to faith, religion, and, more specifically in his context, Christianity, is ambiguous, but it is certainly true that some of his ideas have been incorporated into philosophy of religion and theology.

Wittgensteinian Fideisim, therefore, is the accusation that some philosophers of religion claim that faith (particularly Christian faith, but the claim is usually advanced against Judaism and Islam as well) is a particular language game and that the language game can only be understood from within the faith, that is, by someone who is a believer already. Therefore, the argument goes, these philosophers argue that religion cannot be criticised from outside the faith. Hence, if we agree that, say, Christianity is a language game, or at least that that language and meanings, actions and activities that constitute Christianity constitute a language game then was can claim that the faith is immune to criticism from without, although not from within, the language game.

These claims about some philosophers of religion were first put forward by Kai Nielson in the mid-1960s. The philosophers in his sights were Peter Winch, Norman Malcolm, and D. Z. Phillips. Eventually, Phillips replied, denying that there is or was such a thing as Wittgensteinian Fideism and that, even if it did exist, he was not such a fideist, and the argument, slowly, developed from there, culminating in the book referred to above, which has Nielson’s original 1967 paper, some of Phillips’ responses, Nielson’s responses to those, and some papers from a 2003 conference on the subject.

It is, admittedly, the sort of book that gets philosophy, and particularly, in this case, philosophy of religion, a bad name. Mostly Phillips and Nielson seem to spend their time talking past each other and accusing each other of not having read what they have written carefully enough. In short, the book can be characterised as two rather grumpy elderly men arguing about who said what about them when. External interventions in the debate do not really seem to help, either. On the whole, I did not feel that the discussion was advanced, let alone resolved, by the papers in the book.

I think the principal problem with the whole debate is that Christianity (and, I suspect, Judaism and Islam, although I do not know) is not a philosophical discussion. Of course, right back to the Patristic Fathers philosophy has been a part of the debates within and about Christianity, but that does not mean that either philosophy or the philosophical categories imported into Christian theology by engagement with philosophy, represent anything other than human ways of exploring, describing and discussing the faith.

Therefore, we can say that while Christian faith has some of the aspects of a language game in Wittgenstein’s terms, the same can be said for, say, chemistry. That does not mean that either Christianity or chemistry is immune from discussion outside those subjects, however. A physicist may comment on either, as may an ethicist or politician. What the comments amount to is not the point; with a fair amount of care and engagement with an alien subject, the external commentator can make pertinent points that require a response.

The other thing about Christianity specifically (asides about how Judaism and Islam are included are only, I fear, there for political correctness rather than the result of any engagement with those faiths) is that it completely ignores, on both sides, any encounter with God. The debate is about the existence of God, the coherence of belief in God, and so on. There is no discussion about how God might be encountered.

In Christianity, of course, the clue is in the name. Christianity is, first and foremost, about the encounter with God in the shape of His incarnate, crucified, and risen Son, Jesus. That is, Christianity is not a series of more or less coherent doctrines, debates, creeds, and activities, but ultimately about the encounter with Jesus. The encounters came first, after all. The accounts of Jesus’ life came afterward and then, as the message was carried out into the world, came the doctrines, creeds, and liturgies that have developed over the last two thousand years or so.

It is, of course, open to us as humans to accept or reject the encounter with God and Jesus. That is a slightly different debate about human freedom and will rather than fideism as such. The language game (or games) which that encounter might produce are perhaps, human constructs and are open to criticism, much like any other human construct or the idea of human constructs itself. If an individual never has the encounter then they are left with a language game to engage with or to reject. If the encounter develops a deeper faith than that in a person who never has it, then that is a matter or human experience and lack of it, not, surely, a philosophical position.

Saturday, October 16, 2021

Levelling Up

There are a few political rallying cries which stir most liberal Westerners: freedom and slavery, for example. This has been an issue in certain right-wing arenas during the Covid-19 pandemic and associated lock-downs and other restrictions on freedom of movement. The freedom from having irresponsible people infect me with a possible lethal and (at the time) hard to treat illness does not seem to be quite so much on the agenda, but no one is perfect.

Equality before the law is another thing upon which liberal democracy is founded, as is the universal franchise, that is that all people should have a vote in deciding who is going to represent them. These things were not always part of our national structures, of course. The obtaining of them was a struggle, and took, in fact, centuries.

One of the early groups to argue and agitate for those things we now consider to be rights under our national constitution were the Levellers. These are to be distinguished from the Diggers (discussed a couple of weeks ago. Indeed, the Diggers seem to have regarded the Levellers as insufficiently radical, describing themselves as the ‘True Levellers’.

The Levellers had their beginnings in the First English Civil War (1642-6). They were never a united political party; more a few well-known leaders and their followers, and a large number of pamphlets and tracts describing a program of reforms. Their main claims and arguments were for a reform of Parliament and religious tolerations. Everyone was born equal in their political philosophy, and no one had a natural right to govern or rule over another free-born person. Government had, therefore to be by consent.

Fair enough, but that begs the question of ‘consent by whom?’ to which the answer was ‘the people’. That raises another question, of whom ‘the people’ are. The complaint was that Parliament was, in two ways, undemocratic. Firstly, the undemocratic elements, the House of Lords and the Monarch had to be stripped of their power. Secondly, while Parliament was officially democratic, in fact, the franchise was so small in many constituencies and many seats were in the pockets of the local gentry as rotten boroughs, the democracy as the voice of the people, in general, was stifled.

The Leveller suggestions were to elect Parliament more frequently – every year or two (depending on which pamphlet we read), giving MPs a modest salary to prevent them being dependent on rich patron and their programs and for the electorate to be all men over 21 except servants (who were expected to vote as their employers directed), the recipients of alms (ditto) and royalists (who would have to wait a decade). If voting was a birthright, it was only to be removed from those who had squandered it – criminals, supporters of the king, the wage earners and so on. Thus the Levellers actually limited the franchise significantly and never seem to have considered the right of women to vote.

The Leveller position was founded on Scripture, a fact which those who regard them as the foundation of the British political left might like to ponder a little. Limitations on the power of government were necessary because the human heart was corrupt and magistrates were likely to err. Certain freedoms were to be respected no matter what Parliament decreed, be it never so democratically elected. Freedom of conscience was likewise to be protected. Conscription was to be outlawed and everyone was to be treated equally under the law.

There were to be limits, of course. True freedom of conscience was liable to land up with trouble. Freedoms should not land up troubling other people or endangering the state. Natural law, of comeliness and civility, should trump religious freedom when required. For the Levellers, perhaps, political liberty was the route to religious liberty. The two could not, at the time, be separated.

For the Levellers God did not choose the university-educated men to be ministers of the Gospel, but the ill-educated, the fishermen and tent-makers of the New Testament. Anyone could, therefore, preach; clergy who spoke of obedience and submission to the government were serving other gods than Jesus. This is a consequence of the Reformation and the printing press – the Bible was available for all the read and discuss, and people did, drawing their own conclusions.

However, people also needed to be instructed in the Gospel, and hence there was a case for having ministers, but these should be elected by the people of gathered churches, rather than imposed by the government and a national church. The Levellers therefore would have separated church and state, something which was not to the liking of many in the country at the time. Politics and religion were not that easily separated.

Of course, theological positions among the Leveller pamphleteers varied, and there is dispute as to how much of their program (such as it was) was theological. Lilburne of course was a well known religious radical, in trouble as a young man before the outbreak of the civil war over distributing banned pamphlets. Many Levellers seem to have taken the core of Christianity as the Golden Rule and it was the basis of their arguments for equality. Old Testament forms of government were overturned by the incarnation. The Old Testament was not, according to the Levellers, a prefiguring of later practices. If the church was a voluntary assembly, then Old Testament ideas of church and government could not apply.

After the 1647 Putney debates, the Levellers were suppressed. They had been too influential, particularly in the army, for the comfort of the government and an ill-timed and ill-planned mutiny led to their decline. They may well have felt betrayed by Cromwell (who spent some time defending Lilburne) and Parliament. The impact of the Levellers was rather small; they existed as a group, albeit loosely, for around six years. None of their proposals were established, and they were forgotten about for two to three centuries, until the Chartists revived some of their demands and, slowly, some of the demanded freedoms were established.

Their program was radical – equality under the law, inalienable natural rights, freedom of conscience, limitations on government, concepts of natural justice and voting rights for the poor. These had never existed, except in their imagined Anglo-Saxon past (before the Norman yoke was imposed). It is little wonder that their demands were too rich for the grandees of the time and, in many places, are still too much for governing classes to swallow.

Saturday, October 2, 2021

The Emergent Multiverse Part I

I have been, slowly and painfully, reading



Wallace, D. (2012). The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum theory According to the Everett Interpretation. Oxford: OUP.



Slowly, because it is a complex subject, and painfully because while I am a fully paid up quantum mechanic, or at least I was, my skills are a bit rusty.

Still, Wallace’s claims so far (I have read Part One of the book) are reasonably clear, even to a rusty quantum physicist. The main claim is that the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics is the only one that does not require additional bits to be added to the formalism of quantum mechanics. Hence, the argument goes, it is the best interpretation of quantum mechanics that we have.

Now, as an argument, this is valid, but it is a bit weak, in my view. Firstly, the interpretation produces nothing measurable, it seems (perhaps it will in due course). Secondly, just because we cannot think of a better interpretation of quantum mechanics than the emergent multiverse view does not mean it is right, it simply means that we cannot think of anything better. So much the worse for us.

A post or two ago I produced a couple of questions about the emergent multiverse view. So far, the book has addressed one of the. I wondered about the multiverse view and Occam’s razor. That is, we are strongly encouraged by Occam’s razor not to multiply entities unnecessarily. Wallace’s reply is that Occam’s razor is valid, but the key word is unnecessarily. That is, his view is that as the formalism of quantum mechanics requires it, creating additional universes does not break Occam’s razor. We multiply entities but not unnecessarily.

This may or may not be true, of course. Within the assumptions that Wallace makes it is reasonable, but I think that worries do remain and are not answered by this assertion. This relates to the over concern I raised, which is where the energy comes from to create another universe, exactly the same as this one, every time something happens to require that to happen in the quantum mechanical formalism. Creating anything, including universes, takes energy, and quantum mechanics, while it can, temporarily, play fast and loose with conservation laws, has to obey them in the final analysis. Quantum mechanics may be weird, but it does not break the conservation of energy.

Without getting too technical, Wallace seems to be arguing, so far as I have followed him, that each quantum transition does not cause a new universe to emerge. Hence, if I have an atom in its ground state and it collides with another atom, and it has a probability of gaining energy to promote its electron to one of two other states, two new universes are not created for the two possible outcomes. It is only when we have (to use the standard example) a cat in a box which may be in one of two states that there are two universes, one with a dead and one with an alive cat. So the number of universes that are created is not so big as it might be, but it is still uncountable.

I still think that there are further worries. Firstly, as an extension of the above, there is still the underlying question of what the quantum formalism means. The normal interpretation of the wave function is that it gives the probability of finding a particle in a given state. While Wallace raises concerns as to what probability means in this case (and, indeed, in wider cases) the wave function is not the particle. That is, the quantum formalism is not a full description of what is going on at the micro-scale. The quantum scale has little to do with our intuitions and understandings, which is based on our macro-scale experience. What we get out of the equations is not reality, or a description of it, but something we can work with.

It seems to me that there is a danger here of taking the relatively clean quantum mechanical description of the world available through the mathematics of Hilbert space and it associated entities, and thinking that this is the description of the world and all that is in it. That seems unlikely. Quantum mechanics is not, despite its success in the twentieth century, the be-all and end-all of physics, let alone science as a whole, or human experience. The status of scientific theories, especially in physics is disputed. Wallace seems to think that because we do not dispute our theories of dinosaurs and take their description of the world to be pretty well true, we should do the same with quantum mechanics, otherwise something is wrong with our conception of science.

However, we need not take the quantum mechanical description of sub-atomic particles to be true in the same sense that we take dinosaurs to be true. Both theories (no doubt; I am not an expert on dinosaurs) have problems in interpretation, but we are not constrained to take both theories as having the same sense of truth about them. Dinosaur theories are true because we can find bones and reconstruct what the creatures may have looked like. Quantum theories are true because we can make predictions about what will happen under certain circumstances which turn out to be valid within experimental error. These are not scientific theories on the same level as each other, it seems to me.

Theories in physics, therefore, are somewhat odder than those in other subjects in science. Mostly, this is because they rely on two aspects that Wallace seems to rather (so far at least) ignore. Firstly, of course, they are based on mathematics. This is not, of course, a problem (except for people who have to learn how to do the mathematics in the first place) but there are questions about what the mathematical entities thus created mean. Secondly, most physics, including quantum mechanics, is the outcome of a process of modeling some aspects of reality. Again, there arises, perhaps more pressingly, questions about what the models mean as representations of reality. We certainly do not have to take them literally. If we do, then perhaps we do land up with an emergent multiverse from quantum mechanics, but the move is not forced.


Contemporary Theology

What, you might well ask, is contemporary theology and why does it matter? I have been reading MacGregor, K. R., Contemporary Theology: A ...